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SOME COMMENTS ON COHN,$ AND REVENUE
RULING 62-92: DEPRECIATION RECAPTURE
By LAWRENCE LEE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The District Court decisions in Motorlease Corp. v. United
States,' and S & A Company v. United States, 2 suggest that the
Cohn case may in the future be severely limited in its application,
but for the conservative attorney the application of Cohn is still a
factor to be considered in buying and selling assets.
Consider, for example, the usual factual pattern involving the
purchase and sale of corporate assets. When one corporation desires
to acquire the assets of another going concern by purchase (to
obtain a stepped-up basis) the transaction may take either of two
forms: (1) Seller's corporation sells the assets to the purchaser
pursuant to a plan of liquidation under section 337.3 The corporation
is then liquidated, the proceeds being distributed to seller subject
to tax at capital gains rates (section 331) ; (2) Seller sells his stock
to the corporate purchaser (subject to tax at capital gains rates)
which in turn liquidates (section 332), its newly acquired subsi-
diary electing to treat the purchase price as the basis of the assets
pursuant to section 334 (b) (2). No gain is recognized to the corpo-
ration under section 336. However, hidden in either of these rela-
tively simple fact patterns is the possible application of the depre-
ciation recapture rule formulated by Cohn and Revenue Ruling
62-92.
Before continuing it should be noted that the issue, to the extent
of depreciation claimed after 1961, may have been rendered moot
with respect to personal property by the passage of section 1245 in
1962. 4 It can be argued that the enactment of a specific section to
deal with the problem should supersede the Internal Revenue
Service's administrative interpretation., Cohn, at least at this
writing, does apply to depreciable real property. However, H.R.
t Cohn v. United States, 259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958).
Briefly stated, the court held that a taxpayer could claim no deduction for depreciation in 'he
taxable year in which the property was sold where the selling price was greater than the deprcc:ated
base at the start of the year.
* Associate in the Denver firm of Ireland, Stapleton, Pryor & Holmes.
1 215 F. Supp. 356 (D. Conn. 1963).
2 218 F. Supp. 677 (D. Minn. 1963).
3 All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, unless otherwise specified.
4 For a discussion of section 1245, see Rustigan, The Taxation of Depreciable Property, 40 Taxes
'907 (1962).
5 See S & A Company v. United Statcs, supra note 2. A Cohn adjustment disallows the depre-
ciation claimed in the year of sale. Section 1245 treats the difference between either recomputed
basis (adjusted basis plus all depreciation claimed or allowable after 1961) or the sales price (or
fair market value) and the adjusted bcsis of the property at the time of disposition, as ordincry
income. The recomputed basis includes allowed and allowable depreciation. See section 1245 (a)
(2). If Cohn is still applicable after the enactment of section 1245 and proposed section 1253, which
adlu5 ment is applied first? A different result might be achieved using either the recompuled basis
formula or sc'es price formula, if the Cohn adjustment is first or second in order of application.
This is especially true because of the inclusion of "allowable" depreciation in the recomputed bas:s
-formula.
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83636 contains in Bill section 220 a new Code section 1250 which
operates to recapture all or a percentage of depreciation on certain
dispositions of the real property. This provision is an outgrowth of
the "real estate tax shelter" proposal contained in President Ken-
nedy's 1963 Tax Message. Certainly to the extent that section 1250
does not effect complete recapture as to real estate, the Service will
argue for the application of the Cohn doctrine. Of course, taxpayers
may also argue that section 1250 supersedes Cohn.
II. THE COHN CASE
Cohn v. United States' involved these facts: Cohn had estab-
lished flying schools during 1941 and 1942 under contracts with the
Army Air Force. The arrangement was expected to last only until
the end of 1944, and the useful life of the property used in the
business was calculated on that basis, with no allowance for salvage
value. The movable equipment was sold in 1944 at a substantial
gain. The Court of Appeals sustained the disallowance of deprecia-
tion claimed in the year the assets were sold because the sales price
exceeded the basis of the assets at the beginning of the year of sale.
The Internal Revenue Service interprets the rationale of the court
to be as follows: In the year of sale the value of the assets is estab-
lished and such value is salvage value for depreciation purposes.
Since in Cohn the readjusted salvage value exceeded the adjusted
basis of the property at the beginning of the year, the asset was in
effect fully depreciated and no deduction was allowable in that
year.
Last year the Service issued Rev. Rul. 62-92,s applying with full
vigor Regulation § 1.167(a)-1. Sections (b) and (c) which, if con-
sidered pari passu, state that salvage value may be redetermined
... by reason of conditions known to exist at the end of the taxable
year. . . ." Regulation § 1.167 (a) -1(c) provides simply that ". . . if
there is a redetermination of useful life under the rules of para-
graph (b) of this section salvage value may be redetermined based
upon facts known at the time of such redetermination of useful
life." Regulation § 1.167 (a) -1 (b) provides that useful life may be
modified if conditions at the end of the taxable year so warrant.
Taxpayers had for years assumed subsection (c) was merely
complementary to subsection (b), i.e., salvage value would be re-
determined only in conjunction with useful life. The Internal
Revenue Service obviously believes that subsection (c) has inde-
pendent application. The ruling itself states:
Accordingly, it is the position of the Service that the Cohn
case applies equally to the 1939 Code and the 1954 Code and
that it is not only reasonable but proper to take the ultimate
6 H.R. 8363, as Ordered Reported to the House on September 10, 1963, The proposed section
1250 is intended to be the counterpart of section 1245. See H. Rept. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
p. A148. Briefly stated, upon disposition of "section 1250 property," the section will recapture the
"applicable percentage" of the lower of (A) the "additional depreciation" or (B) the excess of the
amount realized (or fair market value) over the adjusted basis of the property. The "applicable
percentage" is 100% minus one percentage point for each full month the property involved was held
after the date on which the property had been held 20 full months. Thus, if the property is held
at least 10 years, the applicable percentage is zero and no gain is treated as ordinary income. The
term "additional depreciation" is the spread between allowed or allowable depreciation over the
depreciation which would have been allowed under the straight-line method.
7 259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958).
8 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 29.
9 See S & A Company v. United States, supra note 2.
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facts into consideration in determining the depreciation de-
duction for the year of disposition of the asset. Therefore, the
deduction for depreciation of an asset used in the trade or
business or in the production of income shall be adjusted in
the year of disposition so that the deduction, otherwise prop-
erly allowable for such year under the taxpayer's method of
accounting for depreciation, is limited to the amount, if any,
by which the adjusted basis of the property at the beginning
of such year exceeds the amount realized from sale or ex-
change.
If
Kilowatts Came Iii Ttbes
The price of a tube of toothpaste would buy
enough electrical energy to operate your TV
set for about 6 weeks or your refrigerator for
over 3 weeks. Small wonder we say electricity
is your biggest household bargain.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO
an inveslor-on.ed utility-on the - -
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III. RECENT CASES
The theory of the Cohn case has since been an issue in seven
reported decisions.10 In Edward v. Lane," the taxpayer, having
elected to report income arising from a long-term construction
contract on the completed contract basis, reported in 1953 the
payments received during the years of performance (1951-1953),
and, correspondingly, deducted all the costs and expenses incurred
during the performance period, which included depreciation on
equipment and physical plant in an amount representing the
entire cost of the depreciable property. In short, the taxpayer did
not assign any salvage value to the equipment. However, when the
original contract was near completion, taxpayer, through his cor-
poration, was the successful bidder for additional work in the area.
Thereafter, beginning in 1953, the depreciable equipment was sold
to the corporation for approximately one-half of its original cost.
In turn the Commissioner fixed the salvage value at the sale price
and disallowed depreciation for 1953.
One of the arguments made by the taxpayer was that the
anticipated salvage value, here zero, if reasonably founded when
estimated, controls and it makes no difference that it finally de-
velops that the equipment in fact has a salvage value. The Tax
Court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, it noted that
depreciation, including salvage value, may be readjusted if condi-
tions so warrant at the close of each year. Second, the court cited
Cohn as authority for the proposition that salvage value can be
adjusted at or near the end of the useful life of the asset when it
is shown by an actual sale of the asset that there is a substantial
difference between what was estimated as salvage and what it
actually develops to be. The court also found that the sales price
of the equipment actually represented an accurate yardstick for
measuring salvage value. However, the Court did state:
The foregoing authorities (Cohn and Wier Long Leaf
Lumber Co., 9 T.C. 990) involved taxpayers who were ac-
tually faced with the necessity of estimating a salvage value
of depreciable assets at the time of acquiring the same. In
the instant case, however, the petitioner faced no such
necessity. He elected to compute his profit, as we have said,
on the completed contract basis. Depreciation, under that
method, is an amount equal to cost of the assets, less the
salvage value thereof. And depreciation is not taken, under
said method, pro rata over the years during which the con-
tract is performed; but, rather, it is taken as one lump sum,
in the year when the contract is completed. Therefore, sal-
vage value of depreciable assets need not be fixed at the
commencement of the contract; it must be found, and de-
ducted from cost, when the contract is completed. It is thus
seen to be totally immaterial and irrelevant, what petitioner's
10 S & A Company v. United States, supra note 2; Motorlease Corp. v. United States, supra note 1;
Wasmer v. United States, 62-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9134, 10 A.F.T.R.2d 6162; Contra Costa Trucking Co..
22 T.C.M. 1018 (1963); Fribourg Navigation Co., 21 T.C.M. 1533 (1962), on appeal to Second Circuit;
Randolph D. Rouse, 39 T.C. 7 (1962); Edward V. Lane, 37 T.C. 188 (1961). See also, Kimball Gas
Prod. Co. v. United States, 63-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9507, 12 A.F.T.R.2d 5105, on appeal to Fifth Circuit,
which, while not citing the Cohn case, did involve a Cohn adjustment in a linuidtinn situation; and
763 C.C.H. para. 8520.
11 37 T.C. 188 (1961).
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anticipation of salvage values were when these assets were
acquired.
r'2
Randolph D. Rouse"3 involved a taxpayer in the business of
buying, owning and renting residential houses in the years in
issue, who depreciated the houses on a straight-line using a 25-year
life without consideration of salvage value. The taxpayer had sold
some of the houses at prices in excess of their undepreciated cost
as of the first of the year of sale. Thus, it was apparent because of
the sale, which the court stated constituted a condition known to
exist at the end of the period for which the return was made, that
the "salvage value" for each house sold was in excess of its unde-
preciated cost for the year of sale. Accordingly, citing Cohn as au-
thority, the court sustained the disallowance of depreciation on the
houses sold for the year of sale.
In Wasmer v. United States,14 the plaintiffs entered into a con-
tract of sale on July 11, 1957 to sell all of the assets of every kind
connected with radio and television stations for a lump sum ap-
proximating $2 million. The assets had been depreciated on the
straight-line and declining balance methods. It is not clear from
the opinion whether salvage was estimated for the assets depre-
ciated on the straight-line method. Because of FCC complications,
title did not pass and the sale was not closed until January 20, 1958.
The Commissioner took the position that the Cohn case applied
since it appeared that the price fixed in the contract as allocated
to the depreciable assets exceeded the book value of those assets
on January 1, 1957. Accordingly, he disallowed depreciation for
1957. The court found as a fact that the actual value of the depre-
ciable assets was less than the book value and that the purchase
price, therefore, did not exceed the salvage value. However, with
respect to the Cohn case, the Court stated:
The Cohn case is claimed by defendant as authorizing a
disallowance of depreciation in 1957 since the contract fixed
actual value. In that case there was a sale of the specific items
of depreciable property. There was no lump sum sale of
depreciable and non-depreciable assets. Here the sale of the
radio and television equipment, as well as all intangibles, was
consummated in 1958 on the contract signed in 1957, the last
full year of use. If the items of depreciable property and no
other had been sold at a specified price Cohn would apply.
It is applied to the extent that actual value is salvage value.
Book value is to be disregarded if less than actual value.';
Fribourg Navigation Co.16 involved a sale of a cargo vessel
costing $469,000 for $695,500 under a plan of liquidation pursuant
to section 337. The vessel was depreciated according to a letter rul-
ing from the Service, the Service having agreed to a straight-line
method on a three-year life and a salvage value amounting to
$54,000. Thus, unlike the previously discussed cases, the taxpayer
in the instant case did use a salvage value, which was in effect
12 Id. at 197.
13 39 T.C. 7 (1962).
14 10 A.F.T.R.2d 6162 (1962).
15 Id. at 6163 (Emphasis supplied).
16 21 T.C.M. 1533 (1962), on appeal to Second Circuit.
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fixed by the Service. The Commissioner's action in disallowing a
depreciation deduction for the year of sale was sustained by the
Tax Court on the authority of Randolph D. Rouse.1
7
In Motorlease Corp. v. United States, 8 the taxpayer was in the
car rental business. Apparently mindful of Massey Motors, Inc. v.
United States,19 the taxpayer, using a straight-line method, did in
fact use a "reasonable" salvage value. Nevertheless, for the years
in issue the taxpayer sold automobiles at prices in excess of their
depreciated basis at the time of sale. In each such instance, the
Commissioner substituted the selling price for the taxpayer's basis,
thereby wiping out any gain but disallowing depreciation for the
year of sale. The substance of the District Court's lengthy opinion
in sustaining the taxpayer was simply that Cohn has no application
to a situation in which the taxpayer claims depreciation on the basis
of a reasonable estimate for salvage value. The Court distinguished
Cohn, Lane and Rouse on the grounds that in those cases the tax-
payer did not utilize any salvage value. The Court, however, did
not have the benefit of Judge Harron's opinion in Fribourg Naviga-
tion Co.,20 which in fact involved a situation wherein the taxpayer
not only used salvage value but a salvage value fixed by the
Service, since that decision did not come down until two days
before the District Court's opinion.
In S & A Company v. United States,2'1 S & A on April 1, 1956
sold its land and depreciable assets, with a total cost of $2,082,256.22
and accumulated depreciation of $943,042.76, in a taxable sale for
$3,099,123.15 electing to report the gain on the installment method.
On its return for the fiscal year ended August 31, 1956, S & A
claimed depreciation in the amount of $125,481.77 for the period
September 11, 1955 to April 1, 1956. The Commissioner disallowed
the deduction on the basis of the Cohn theory. The District Court,
in a well reasoned opinion, reviewed the history of section 167 and
the regulations thereunder and reached these conclusions: (1) that
the regulations authorize adjustment of salvage value only when
useful life is adjusted, and useful life may only be adjusted when
there is a clear and convincing basis to do so; (2) that Massey
Motors2 2 authorized adjustment of useful life only when it is shown
17 Supro note 14.
18 Supro note 1.
nt 364 U.S. 92 (1959).
20 Supro note 16.
21 Supro note 2.
22 Supra note 19.
KELLY GIRLS * Skilled * Tested * Bonded
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that the taxpayer did not intend to use the assets for their full
useful life, and (3) that Cohn and Wier Long Leaf Lumber Co.2 3
decided only that the original estimate of useful life may be recon-
sidered in the year that the useful life of the assets terminates in
normal course, and do not represent authority to readjust useful life
because of a casual sale of the assets before termination of their
expected life. With respect to Rev. Rul. 62-92, the court commented:
The body of the Ruling discusses the Cohn case and pro-
ceeds to assert that the Regulations saying there shall be no
change in salvage value because of fluctuations in market
value "does not preclude adjustment of salvage value where
there is a clear and convincing basis therefor even though no
adjustment of useful life is required." It is apparent that this
Ruling is broader than the decision in Cohn. Were it to be
followed, it certainly would encompass the facts of the case
at bar. And yet, the Ruling defines Cohn as a case in which
"it was held that it is proper * * * in computing the deduc-
tion for depreciation of an asset, to adjust salvage value at
or near the end of the useful life of an asset where there is a
difference between what was estimated and what salvage
value as shown by actual sale proves to be." (Italics added)
Thus, I must conclude that either the Ruling is limited to the
fact situation of disposal of assets at or near the end of useful
life, or that the Ruling is erroneous as a matter of law. The
result of such a decision being identical on the facts here, it
becomes unnecessary to make the choice.
2 4
Finally, Contra Costa Trucking.,2 5 in which the Commissioner
disallowed depreciation in the year of sale, involved an effort by
the taxpayer to bring itself within the dictum of Wasmer v. United
States" 6 by arguing that Cohn does not apply to the sale of a going
concern (depreciable and nondepreciable assets). The Tax Court
sustained the Commissioner on factual grounds, viz., that the sale in
fact concerned only the depreciable property in issue, and, even if
a sale of a going concern, because the taxpayer failed to prove that
the allocated purchase price did not exceed the opening basis.
On balance the Service has been largely successful in applying
the Cohn case, although decisions such as S & A Company v. United
States"-7 may represent a new trend in the cases. However, in view
of the Service's success in the Tax Court,2s the revenue agents will
undoubtedly be instructed to continue to apply the Cohn theory to
pre-section 1245 (and proposed section 1250) years, or in areas to
which the statutory recapture rules do not apply.
IV. TAXPAYER'S POSITION
The taxpayer's arguments can be summarized along these lines:
It was the design of Congress in enacting section 167 to permit a
taxpayer to recover, tax-free, the total cost to it of assets used in
23 9 T.C. 990 (1947), reversed on different issue, 173 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1949).
24 Supra note 2 at 685.
-5 22 T.C.M. 1018 (1963).
26 Supra note 14.
27 Supra note 2.
28 Fribourg Navigation Co., supra note 16 is now on appeal to the Second Circuit. The case is
a strong one factually for the taxpayer and the Commissioner may have made a serious error in
not conceding.
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its trade or business. Annual allowances for depreciation are de-
ductible to reflect this decrease in value. Thus, the allowance is
that amount which should be set aside for the taxable year so that
the aggregate of the amounts set aside, plus the salvage value, will,
at the end of the estimated useful life of the depreciable property,
equal the cost or other basis of the property.
2 9
Salvage value is the amount, determined at the time of acquisi-
tion, which is estimated will be realizable upon sale or other disposi-
tion of an asset when it is no longer useful in the taxpayer's trade
or business.
30
A determination of salvage value is based on the taxpayer's
consistent practice and experience. If a taxpayer disposes of an
asset in a casual sale before its physical exhaustion, it should,
nevertheless, be entitled to depreciate that asset on the basis of the
estimated useful life and salvage value dictated by its customary
experience or practice, and not on a useful life equal to the time
the asset was actually held. 31 Massey Motors v. United States3"
holds nothing more than that salvage value may equal "resale
value" if the asset may reasonably be expected to be disposed of
prior to the end of its physical life.
It is the announced policy of the Internal Revenue Service not
to disturb depreciation deductions computed on an estimated useful
life and salvage value, unless "there is a clear and convincing basis
for change.' 33 Salvage value may not be changed at any time after
the determination made at the time of acquisition merely because
of changes in price levels.
3 4
Finally, to the extent the Service is equating the sales price to
final salvage value vis-a-vis the original estimate, it is using hind-
sight, which is prohibited. 35
This is substantially the argument put forth successfully by the
taxpayer in S & S Company v. United States,36 but rejected by the
Tax Court. The Service's formula in the Tax Court seems to be
simply that it has authority to adjust salvage whenever conditions
so warrant 3 7 that Massey Motors v. United States 3s requires a
realistic estimate of salvage value, and that a sale price in excess
of basis demonstrates a realistic value which is a "clear and con-
vincing" basis for change. As Rev. Rul. 62-92 states:
The provision in section 1.167 (a) -1 (c) of the regulations to
the effect that salvage value shall not be changed at any time
after the determination made at the time of acquisition
merely because of changes in price levels applies to assets
still on hand. The provision does not preclude adjustment of
salvage value where there is a clear and convincing basis
29 Tre0s. Reg. § 1.167(a)-l(a) (1956), as amended. T.D. 6507, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 91.
30 Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)-I(c) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6507, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 91.
31 Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)-1(b)-(c) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6507, 1960.2 Cum. Bull. 91.
32 Supra note 19.
33Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(b)-(c) (1956); Rev. Rul. 90, 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 43; Rev. Rul. 91, 1953-1
Cum. Bull. 44.
34 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(c) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6507, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 91.
35 Commissioner v. Cleveland Adolph M. R. Corp., 160 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir. 1947), reversing 6 T.C.
730 (1946); Commissioner v. Mutual Fertilizer Co., 159 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1947), reversing 5 T.C. 112
(1945); Universal Mills, 7 T.C.M. 886 (1948). See also Washburn Wire Co. v. Commissioner, 67 F.2d
658 (1st Cir. 1933), r'eversing 26 B.T.A. 464, 1146 (1932); Geuder, Paeschke & Fref Co., 41 F.2d
308 (7th Cir. 1930), reversing 11 8.T.A. 1248 (1928).
36 Supro note 2.
37 Wier Long Leaf Lumber Co., supra note 23.
38 Supra note 19.
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therefor even though no adjustment of useful life is required.
The purpose of the provision is to eliminate needless and
endless controversies over depreciation allowances which at
best are merely informed estimates of the cost of using the
property in the taxpayer's business. That purpose has been
served when the asset is disposed of and when a final trans-
action has occurred over which there can be no dispute or
difference of opinion or judgment.
V. PRE-YEAR OF DISPOSITION ADJUSTMENT
The harshness of the Service's administrative position could be
deflected in large part by carefully planning the date of the sale,
and, perhaps, if the Service stopped there, nothing more could be
said.39 However, alarming reports from the Boston, San Francisco,
Detroit, and Pittsburgh offices indicate that the Service is endeavor-
ing to extend its position even further in two respects. If Wasmer v.
United States40 is any indication, it has already done so successfully
in one area. Wasmer, while lost on the value issue, did indicate that
salvage could be adjusted for the pre-sale year if the price of the
depreciable assets was fixed by contract in that year, and the price
so fixed exceeded not only the opening basis of the assets for the
year in which the sale takes place but also the opening basis for the
year in which the sales price is fixed by contract. The ruling, Rev.
Rul. 62-92, extended only to the year of sale so that the Service's
position, to a degree, came without warning.
Furthermore, the Service is also taking a position that it is not
essential that the value of the assets be fixed by a sale, but that any
method by which the value can be ascertained is a suitable basis for
a Cohn adjustment. While the ruling concerned a sale, the language
used was "sale or exchange," although it did intimate that only a
sale could establish a value "over which there can be no dispute
or difference of opinion or judgment." Thus, the Service apparently
takes the position that it may adjust salvage value not only in the
year of disposition (whether by sale or otherwise), but also for each
prior open year in which the value of the depreciable assets is fixed
39 Using the first simple example set forth in the introduction, if when the corporation sells the
assets the price as allocated to the assets exceeds the adjusted basis of those assets at the begin-
ning of the taxable year of sale, then any depreciation claimed by the corporation in that year
will be disallowed (at least to the extent the depreciation deduction equals the spread between ad-
justed basis and sales price). The solution is to sell the assets as soon as possible after the first of
the year, or to delay to the next year if the transaction is shaping up near the close of !he year.
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by some identifiable event and that value exceeds the adjusted basis
of the assets.41 So far, this interpretation has only manifested itself
in the area of liquidations. Fribourg Navigation Co. 42 involved a
liquidation pursuant to section 337. Such an adjustment, of course,
can be rationalized by the fact that a sale is involved. However,
several cases have arisen in which the Service is taking the position
that because an allocation, pursuant to section 334(b) (2), of the
purchase price of the stock as fixed in a contract of purchase would
attribute a value to the assets in excess of their adjusted basis either
at the beginning of the taxable year in which the liquidation takes
place or in the year in which the stock is purchased, the test of
Rev. Rul. 62-92 is satisfied.
43
VI. LIQUIDATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 332 and 334 (b) (2)
The remainder of this paper is devoted to suggesting some of
the arguments that can be made to answer the Commission's con-
tention.
44
A. Year of Liquidation
Initially it should be noted that while the purchase of 80% of
the stock of a company and its subsequent liquidation within a
two-year period provides a method for determining basis of the
assets in the hands of the purchaser under section 334(b) (2), the
acquired corporation is not regarded as selling the assets so as to
recognize gain or loss.4 5 The shareholders of the acquired corpora-
tion are regarded as selling stock, not assets. There is not, therefore,
a sale of assets by the transferor corporation. Under Rev. Rul. 62-92
41 Apparently the Service, on this basis, could argue that Cohn applies to the exceptions pro-
vided in section 1245(b) and proposed section 1250.
42 Supra note 16.
43 Consider the effect of this approach on the second example given in the introduction, with
these additional facts: The contract to purchase the stock for $110,000 is signed on December 1,
1960. The aggregate basis of the depreciable assets as of January 1, 1960, is $90,000 and depre-
ciation for the year (January 1 to December 31) is $10,000, resulting in an end-of-year adjusted
basis of $80,000. The parent liquidates the subsidiary on July 1, 1961, the subsidiary claiming de-
preciation for six months of $5,000 for the short year January 1 to July 1, 1961. The parent i.e.,
the purchasing corporation may find that as a result of a Cohn adjustment, it has purchased $15,000
of ordinary income. The Service will argue that the contract fixed a price for the assets on Decem-
ber 1, 1960, which on an allocated basis is in excess of their opening basis, and, accordingly, salvage
should be readjusted upward to eliminate the depreciation for 1960. Further, as to 1961, the re-
adjusted basis is $90,000 which nevertheless is still less than the $110,000 paid for the stock
(allocated to assets). Accordingly, the $5,000 depreciation claimed for the short year will be dis-
allowed. If the Cohn theory is not applicable, no adjustment of depreciation is warranted under
section 1245 since the disposition took place before December 31, 1962. But if the liquidation was
post January 1, 1963, then section 1245 would cut across sections 332 and 336 (because of the ap-
plicability of section 334(b) (2) and treat as ordinary income all depreciation deducted after Decem-
ber 31, 1961 (i.e., the lesser of either recomputed basis or sales price over the adjusted basis of the
property at disposition). Presumably, however, if the parent assumes the liability for any deficiency
in tax resulting from either a Cohn or section 1245 adjustment, its basis (in the stock and therefore
in the distributed assets) will be increased by that amount-Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c) (4)(v); Sen. Rept.
No. 1881 87th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 285 (August 16, 1962).
44 The arguments presented are strictly legal arguments. It is, of course, open to the taxpayer
to argue that factually the price is not ascertained before the close of the year because of the
existence of some sort of condition precedent to closing the deal. For example, suppose the contract
is signed by the Seller and Purchaser on December 1, 1963, providing that Seller will sell all of
his stock in exchange for cash and stock of the purchasing corporation provided, however, that
the stock of the purchasing corporation on the closing date is quoted at $40.00 on the stock exchange.
The closing date is set for January 15, 1964. Rev. Rul. 69-92 did contain this proviso:
Revenue Rulings 90 and 91, as clarified by Revenue Procedure 57-18, are, of course, ap-
plicable for taxable years prior to the year of disposition where there is a clear and can-
vincing basis existing at the end of such prior taxable year for an adjustment in the de-
preciation deduction. See also section 1.167(b)-O(a) of the regulations.
The argument could be made that because of the condition precedent, the deal could fall through
before the actual closing date if the price on the exchange was below $40.00 and, accordingly, the
contract was not a "clear and convincing basis for a change" in the depreciation claimed.
45 Dallas Downtown Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 114 (1949), acq. 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 2;
Steubenville Bridge Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 789 (1948), acq., 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 5.
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the depreciation adjustment is limited with respect to the amount
realized from a "sale or exchange." Cohn involved a sale. Subsequent
Tax Court decisions are based on sales of the assets.
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In the liquidation that follows the acquisition of stock there is
no determination under section 1001 (b) of the "amount realized"
by the transferor, i.e., the determination called for in Rev. Rul.
62-92. Even if a corporation could be considered to realize anything
on the receipt of its shares for cancellation, the need for this
determination is dispensed with by section 336, which precludes
recognition of gain on a distribution of property in partial or com-
plete liquidation. Accordingly, there is no occasion to determine
whether opinions will agree or differ as to values to be assigned
to assets distributed in liquidation.
In fact, the purchase price of the stock does not necessarily even
purport to provide an undisputed measure of the aggregate fair
market value of the several assets of the corporation less its
liabilities. It would be a coincidence if the purchase price of all of
the stock of a corporation was equal to the aggregate of the values
of the depreciable and non-depreciable assets of the corporation,
separately computed, either at the date of liquidation or at the date
of stock purchase. Accordingly, the common agreement as to the
value of individual depreciable assets, which is the basis from which
Rev. Rul. 62-92 purports to apply, does not exist.
In the case of a transaction in which the "amount realized" is
determined, and to which Rev. Rul. 62-92 by its terms applies, the
taxable event is a sale of a specific depreciable asset which permits
an uncontested determination of the consideration received there-
for, and hence of the salvage value. In the case of a transaction to
which section 334(b) (2) applies, the only event in the year of
liquidation to which Rev. Rul. 62-92 could apply is the distribution
of assets in exchange for stock. But if this event alone is sufficient
to invoke the rule of Rev. Rul. 62-92, the Internal Revenue Service
cannot logically stop at section 332 liquidations to which section
334(b) (2) applies. The significant event, a transfer of assets in
exchange for stock in which no gain is recognized to the transferor,
occurs as well in section 332 liquidations to which section 334 (b) (1)
applies, in reorganization exchanges under section 368 (a) (1) (C)
and section 361 (a), in taxable liquidations under section 331 and
tax-free liquidations under section 333, in partial liquidations under
section 346, and in redemptions under section 302. It is no answer
to say that in the first two cases a transferor's basis is carried over,
since Rul. 62-92, unlike section 1245, disallows depreciation prior
to the transaction by which the asset is disposed of, and hence
redetermines its basis at the date of disposition. It may be seriously
questioned whether the Service is prepared to take the position that
Rev. Rul. 62-92 is applicable in each of the transactions above
enumerated.
B. Year in which Stock is Purchased
The execution of such an executory contract for the purchase of
stock or, indeed, its consummation within the taxable year by the
46 See e.g., Fribourg Navigation Co., supro note 16; Randolph D. Rouse, supra note 13; Edward V.
Lane, supro note 11.
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purchase of the stock, itself provides no transaction determining
the salvage value of taxpayer's depreciable assets "over which there
can be no dispute or difference of opinion or judgment." No deter-
mination of separate asset value or redetermination of basis of
assets is required by this event, even if the purchased company
thereby becomes a member of an affiliated group filing consoli-
dated returns. Again, if the purchase price of the stock represented
the aggregate of the separate fair market values of the assets, de-
preciable and non-depreciable, it would be the sheerest coincidence.
The only event which occurs in the year in which the contract
is executed or the purchase is consummated is the establishment
of an aggregate value for the stock. The aggregate fair market value
of a company's stock may also be established for tax purposes when
the sole stockholder dies or makes a gift of all of the stock. Is Rev.
Rul. 62-92 therefore to be applied to the corporation in each such
case?
In the case of a listed stock the fair market value of all its shares
may be determined from market quotations, with suitable adjust-
ments for blockage prescribed by the Internal Revenue Service.
Is Rev. Rul. 62-92 to be applied to such companies day by day?
The Service presumably is invoking Rev. Rul. 62-92 on the
theory that the purchasers of the transferor's stock amounts "in
effect" to the purchase of its assets, including its depreciable assets.
In the case of the garden variety of purchase contemplated by Rev.
Rul. 62-92 there is no problem in determining the amount for which
the property has been purchased. In the case of a liquidation under
section 334 (b) (2), however, the problems become extremely com-
plex.
Under section 334(b) (2) the liquidation can occur as long as
two years after the purchase of the stock. The adjustments neces-
sary to determine, upon liquidation, how much the individual items
of property were purchased for, i.e., their basis, are quite complex.
First, the basis of the stock itself must be adjusted for transactions
occurring during the period between the purchase of the stock and
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liquidation. 4- The basis of the stock so adjusted must then be allo-
cated on the basis of relative fair market-values of the properties
on the date they are received in the liquidation.
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The discussion above relates to the problems which can arise
in the application of Rev. Rul. 62-92 due to variations in the values
of the depreciable properties and other properties between the
purchase of the stock and the liquidation. Further problems are
raised by reason of the prospect of changes in the assets themselves
by reason of dispositions during this period. That such dispositions
are to be anticipated is evidenced by the examples given in Regula-
tion § 1.334-1 (c) (5). The problem would be even more acute if, in
the examples given, the depreciable property had been disposed of
in a tax-free exchange for other depreciable property pursuant to
the provisions of section 1031 (a).
The fact is that at the time a contract for the purchase of stock is
executed, and even when the stock is purchased, the parent can
have no assurance as to what individual assets it will be considered
to have "in effect purchased" for purposes of section 334 (b) (2). If
the Service proposes an adjustment under Rev. Rul. 62-92 for a
taxable year prior to the liquidation it may be found that the de-
preciable property adjusted will have been sold, exchanged, dis-
tributed or destroyed before a liquidation occurs. No portion of the
basis established by the purchase price of the stock may therefore
in fact be applied to the depreciable property subjected to deprecia-
tion disallowance on the basis of such purchase price.
A corporate purchaser is under no obligation at the time it pur-
chases 80% control of a subsidiary to make a commitment or
election to liquidate the company within the two-year period
provided in section 334 (b) (2). It is not infrequently the case that a
decision whether to liquidate or not is deferred for the full 24
months in order to ascertain whether it is more advantageous tax-
wise and business-wise to liquidate immediately before expiration
of the two-year period, immediately afterwards, or to maintain the
corporation in existence.
If the Internal Revenue Service proposes to apply Rev. Rul. 62-92
to disallow depreciation in the taxable year in which a contract
for the purchase of 80% of the stock of a subsidiary is executed or
cunsummated but in which a liquidation has not occurred, it must
be prepared to apply this rule in the case of every such purchase,
whether a liquidation within two years has been proposed or dis-
affirmed, because the parent retains a free election.
VII. CONCLUSION
Finally, it should be noted that some taxpayers have suggested
that if Cohn is logically extended, the taxpayer should be entitled
to greater depreciation in the year of sale if the asset is in fact
sold for less than its remaining undepreciated basis. This question
is largely settled by section 1231 which permits the taxpayer an
ordinary loss (to be offset by section 1231 gains) if the asset is sold
at a loss. However, this is not to say the argument should not be
pressed in areas to which section 1231 is not applicable.




) (1955), as amended, T.D. 6298, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 432.
4, Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4)(viii) (1955), as amended, T.D. 6298, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 432.
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